Find those that are animate or inanimate, moving or motionless. Imagine writing prose while being aware of the quality of the word in regard to movement. Life is movement and change—and the conflict it implies. It should be obvious how word choice can improve the reader interest in well-crafted prose.
When an inanimate object is on the page, writers often need to prevent the burned-out effect inanimate objects create. Some inanimate objects, with modification, can imply motion (and impending conflict). Here are examples:
Friendship, as understood here, is a distinctively personalrelationship that is grounded in a concern on the part of each friendfor the welfare of the other, for the other’s sake, and thatinvolves some degree of intimacy. As such, friendship is undoubtedlycentral to our lives, in part because the special concern we have forour friends must have a place within a broader set of concerns,including moral concerns, and in part because our friends can helpshape who we are as persons. Given this centrality, importantquestions arise concerning the justification of friendship and, inthis context, whether it is permissible to “trade up” whensomeone new comes along, as well as concerning the possibility ofreconciling the demands of friendship with the demands of morality incases in which the two seem to conflict.
Conflict is an interactive, but opposing behavior between persons, groups or organizations with goals that are not compatible. Conflicts are common in workplaces. Research studies have indicated that conflict is a doubled edged sword, since it has several benefits, yet has the potential to cause severe problems in an organization. Therefore, organizations must find a way of solving disputes. This essay will discuss some of the methods that one can use to resolve conflicts in the workplaces.
The beauty of language is enhanced when motion and conflict can be incorporated in the prose to maintain a reader’s interest word by word. In writing, the reader’s mind is active in creating and forming images. Basically, authors don’t create still-life images, they paint portraits that intrigue and engage the reader with scenes that live on the page. There was a bird on a limb. Static. The flying bird settled on the limb. Improved with some action. The olive branch quivered when the claws of the sparrow grasped the sturdy twig. A lot of energy.
Cocking & Kennett (1998) argue against such a mirroring view intwo ways. First, they claim that this view places too much emphasis onsimilarity as motivating and sustaining the friendship. Friends can bevery different from each other, and although within a friendship thereis a tendency for the friends to become more and more alike, thisshould be understood as an effect of friendship, notsomething constitutive of it. Second, they argue that the appeal tothe friend’s role as a mirror to explain the increasingsimilarity involves assigning too much passivity to the friend. Ourfriends, they argue, play a more active role in shaping us, and themirroring view fails to acknowledge this. (Cocking &Kennett’s views will be discussed further below. Lynch (2005)provides further criticisms of the mirroring view, arguing that thedifferences between friends can be central and important to theirfriendship.)
Of course, Aristotle (and Annas) would reject this reading: friends donot merely have such similarities antecedent to their friendship as anecessary condition of friendship. Rather, friends can influence andshape each other’s evaluative outlook, so that the sharing of asense of value is reinforced through the dynamics of theirrelationship. One way to make sense of this is through theAristotelian idea that friends function as a kind of mirror of eachother: insofar as friendship rests on similarity of character, andinsofar as I can have only imperfect direct knowledge about my owncharacter, I can best come to know myself—both the strengths andweaknesses of my character—by knowing a friend who reflects myqualities of character. Minor differences between friends, as when myfriend on occasion makes a choice I would not have made, can lead meto reflect on whether this difference reveals a flaw in my owncharacter that might need to be fixed, thereby reinforcing thesimilarity of my and my friend’s evaluative outlooks. On thisreading of the mirroring view, my friend plays an entirely passiverole: just by being himself, he enables me to come to understand myown character better (cf. Badhwar 2003).
As noted in the 3rd paragraph of , Friedman thinks my commitment to my friend cannot be grounded inappraisals of her, and so my acknowledgment of the worth of her goals,etc., is a matter of my bestowing value on these: her ends becomevaluable to me, and so suitable for motivating my actions, “justbecause they are hers.” That is, such a commitment involvestaking my friend seriously, where this means something like findingher values, interests, reasons, etc. provide me with protanto reasons for me to value and think similarly. In this way, the dynamics of the friendship relation involves friendsmutually influencing each other’s sense of value, which therebycomes to be shared in a way that underwrites significant intimacy.
An important question to ask, however, is what precisely is meant bythe “sharing” of a sense of value. Once again there areweaker and stronger versions. On the weak side, a sense of value isshared in the sense that a coincidence of interests and values is anecessary condition of developing and sustaining a friendship; whenthat happy coincidence dissipates, so too does the friendship. It ispossible to read Annas’s summary of Aristotle’s view offriendship this way (1988, 1):
Brink (1999) criticizes Whiting’s account of friendship as tooimpersonal because it fails to understand the relationship offriendship itself to be intrinsically valuable. (For similarcriticisms, see Jeske 1997.) In part, the complaint is the same asthat which Friedman (1989) offered against any conception offriendship that bases that friendship on appraisals of thefriend’s properties (cf. the 3rd paragraph of above): such a conception of friendship subordinates our concern forthe friend to our concern for the values, thereby neglecting whatmakes friendship a distinctively personal relationship. GivenWhiting’s understanding of the sense in which friends sharevalues in terms of their appeal to the intrinsic and impersonal worthof those values, it seems that she cannot make much of the rebuttal toFriedman offered above: that I can subordinate my concern for certainvalues to my concern for my friend, thereby changing my values in partout of concern for my friend. Nonetheless, Brink’s criticismgoes deeper:
Their point is that the secrets view underestimates the kind of trustat issue in friendship, conceiving of it largely as a matter ofdiscretion. Given the way friendship essentially involves each caringabout the other’s good for the other’s sake and so actingon behalf of the other’s good, entering into and sustaining arelationship of friendship will normally involve considerabletrust in your friend’s goodwill towards you generally, and notjust concerning your secrets. Moreover, friendship will normallyinvolve trust in your friend’s judgment concerning what is inyour best interests, for when your friend sees you harming yourself,she ought, other things being equal, to intervene, and through thefriendship you can come to rely on her to do so. (See also Alfano,2016, who emphasizes not just trust but trustworthiness to makesimilar points.)